Why Another Blog?

I've decided to set up another blog, (my other one is called Writer's Musings), because there are some topics just too weighty for that blog.

So here it is. In this space I'll explore more serious issues in more detail. I do not expect visitors to agree with me in all cases.
In this forum feel free to take off the gloves, grab a handful of mud and fight for what you believe in.

Simple rules, rather like cage-fighting in the blogosphere:
No direct name calling. No excessive profanity. No whining when smacked in the face with mud.
Sling inuendo. Feel free to ask leading questions even if in a snide tone.

Sunday, November 16, 2008

Playing into the Enemy's Hands

Below is an article from the Christian Science Monitor in the aftermath of the suicide attack on the Ministry of Information and Culture in Kabul. My analysis of this article appears below the article. The main point is that this is yet another example of the blissfully ignorant media playing right into the hands of the insurgents.


Insurgents increasingly employing complex attacks in Afghanistan
Thursday's strike on an Afghan ministry was carried out by a team using multiple attack methods.
By Anand Gopal Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor
from the October 31, 2008 edition



Kabul, Afghanistan - A suicide bomber detonated explosives inside a government ministry Thursday, killing at least five and injuring dozens. The attack is the latest in a series this year showing insurgents' ability to penetrate the capital using complicated and daring methods.

"Security in the capital is decreasing day by day," says Ajmal Karimi, analyst with the Center for Peace and Conflict studies, a Kabul-based think tank.

He says that Thursday's attack, which involved multiple insurgents and included small-arms fire, is an example of the sophisticated methods increasingly used.

"With these types of attacks the insurgents are able to make people feel that they cannot trust the government to keep them safe even in the capital," he says.

At least three insurgents entered the Ministry of Information and Culture, located in a busy section of Kabul, Thursday morning. Witnesses say a gunfight broke out between security officials and the guerrillas, followed by a massive blast that destroyed much of the ministry's first floor. According to some reports, two insurgents escaped the scene.

The Taliban claimed responsibility, saying they were targeting foreign advisers. Insurgents may also have hit the ministry because it was one of the least secure.

Kabul is heavily guarded, with thousands of police patrolling, many main arteries closed to traffic, and blast walls surrounding most government buildings. Yet insurgents have staged numerous high-profile attacks.

"In these types of attacks, the insurgents may send one suicide bomber toward the target while another fighter distracts security forces with gunfire," says Mr. Karimi.

While the attack involved a small team, many complex attacks involve greater numbers of fighters and a more diverse combination of attack methods. According to an American intelligence official with the international forces, this year has seen a 6 to 12 percent increase in assaults involving more than 20 insurgents and multiple attack methods.

The blast comes amid talk of negotiations between the Afghan government and the Taliban. "Our enemies are trying to undermine recent efforts by the government for a peaceful solution to end the violence," President Hamid Karzai said in a statement.
Danna Harman contributed to this report from Kabul.

My comments:

The attack is the latest in a series this year showing insurgents' ability to penetrate the capital using complicated and daring methods.

This statement is never explained or elaborated anywhere in the article. What “complicated” or “daring” methods were used to “penetrate” the capital? Kabul is a big city with over 4 million inhabitants. There is not a solid wall, fence or other barrier that rings the city. The main roads are not the only ways into the city.

"Security in the capital is decreasing day by day," says Ajmal Karimi, analyst with the Center for Peace and Conflict studies, a Kabul-based think tank.

And we have arrived at this conclusion based upon what evidence? By the way it is the Center for Conflict and Peace Studies (CAPS) and Ajmal Karimi strangely does not appear on the staff page as an analyst. He may very well work there, but if he does he is a low-level researcher.

The CAPS website states: “Armed groups in Afghanistan, just as in the Middle East and Pakistan, use the media to propagate their message, solicit both moral and financial support, and provide distant training and exchange of logistical information required to launch successful operations.”

The Christian Science Monitor, just like the main stream media plays right into the insurgents’ hands with uninformed reports like this one.

Kabul is heavily guarded, with thousands of police patrolling, many main arteries closed to traffic, and blast walls surrounding most government buildings.

Thousands of police in a large sprawling city of four million is hardly surprising. The “main arteries” closed to traffic are those in the immediate vicinity of the Presidential Palace, the Ministry of the Interior (National Police Headquarters), and the Ministry of Defense. Hardly surprising given the threat of VBIED’s (Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device). In fact if these roads were left open, one would then need to be critical of lax security. It only takes one VBIED in the right place at the right time to create havoc. This isn’t much different from in the US where traffic is no longer allowed around certain government buildings. (Have you tried to drive in front of the White House lately?)

Yet insurgents have staged numerous high-profile attacks.

I’m very curious as to how we have arrived at “numerous” high-profile attacks. Let’s see: January 2008, Hotel Serena; April 2008, Assassination attempt on President Karzai; July 2008, Suicide VBIED attack on the Indian Embassy; October 2008, Suicide BBIED (Body Borne Improvised Explosive Device) at the Ministry of Information and Culture. That’s only four even though the media would have us believe that Kabul is about to fall to the Taliban. So far that works out to one every three months, but it still misses a key point.

What do three of the four have in common? In three of the four cases lax security around what should have been recognized as potential high-profile targets invited the attacks.

In the case of Hotel Serena, not only was security lax in the first place, there was advance warning of an impending attack and no action was taken to tighten security even though on the day of the attack the Norwegian embassy was hosting a reception there.

In the Indian Embassy attack the road that should have been blocked to regular traffic was not. The Indian Embassy is right across the street from the Afghan Ministry of the Interior, which may have actually been the intended target. Given that the road is now blocked except for authorized traffic, a repeat is unlikely.

He says that Thursday's attack (Oct 30), which involved multiple insurgents and included small-arms fire, is an example of the sophisticated methods increasingly used.

Three guys charging a lightly-guarded gate firing AK’s is hardly sophisticated, in fact it is pretty basic.

"With these types of attacks the insurgents are able to make people feel that they cannot trust the government to keep them safe even in the capital," he says.

Clearly that is the goal of this type of attack, whether or not such attacks have achieved this goal is a matter of conjecture. Within hours of this particular attack it was business as usual in this busy market part of town.

Insurgents may also have hit the ministry because it was one of the least secure.

This is the primary reason the insurgents hit this particular ministry. The Ministry is located off a busy market street where hundreds of people are milling all day long. Security here was very lax with virtually no “stand-off” to even slow a potential attacker who simply had to sprint the twenty yards from the gate to the front lobby and detonate.

Again, Kabul is a large, sprawling city with more points of entry than can be properly guarded by even a million police officers and yet there have been only four “high-profile” attacks this year (the year of the greatest number of attacks nation-wide). In at least three of the four attacks there were significant security lapses that contributed to creating conditions conducive to attack.

The enemy exploits perceived weakness. That should be expected. As hardening and awareness reduces opportunity, the enemy looks for new opportunities. That is why one cannot become complacent. We are facing a thinking enemy. It is idiotic to imagine that he will not adjust his tactics and methods to counter our actions. The fact that he does so is not indicative of increased capability on his part or deteriorating security on our part.

While the attack involved a small team, many complex attacks involve greater numbers of fighters and a more diverse combination of attack methods. According to an American intelligence official with the international forces, this year has seen a 6 to 12 percent increase in assaults involving more than 20 insurgents and multiple attack methods.

So what if they fail? As they have in all cases. The fact that a group of attackers uses hand grenades and small arms, makes an attack “complex” by military definitions, but this does not equate to “sophisticated” in the civilian sense of complication.

By the way, total casualties for the year are actually down significantly from last year. So despite the alleged increase in “sophistication” and “complexity” the attacks are less efficient. Higher concentrations of insurgents are not a liability to us because we have them out-gunned. When they choose to mass, they are easier to detect, target and kill.