Comments on the Comments about Mumbai

In the aftermath of the Mumbai massacre, a number of Western pundits, both liberal and conservative, have offered some pretty irrational commentary. Most of them get off the main issue of the specific event and turn their commentary to a general condemnation of Islam and Muslims.

This is a counter-productive and flat wrong-headed approach. Have any of these writers bothered to tally up the Muslim victims of terrorist violence? In the Mumbai attacks, for example, there were also Muslim victims. These murderers, who claim they are killing for God, are no respecters of one’s religion. They gleefully kill anyone. Look at who is primarily dying in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan at the hands of these murderous thugs. It isn’t coalition troops or foreign aid workers; it is the local inhabitants – Muslims – who are dying in the tens of thousands.

Another argument that seems common is to claim that Muslims do not condemn these attacks – that the voice of Muslims is silent. Well, it only seems silent because the West’s ever-vigilant professional journalists are as intellectually lazy as their readers and viewers. Muslims are speaking out. Many have been murdered for doing so. In order to find this out, one must make the effort to read Muslim media. It’s out there.

The Organization of the Islamic Conference, an association of 56 Islamic states, condemned the terror attacks in Mumbai stating that: “…these acts of violence contradict all human values and can be justified by nothing” (emphasis added).

A businessman from Dubai writes:

It is not enough for moderate Muslims to be revolted by the attacks in Mumbai as we have been revolted by the attacks on the New York office towers, Amman wedding, London transport system, Madrid trains, Beslan school, Jerusalem pizzeria, Baghdad markets and numerous other places. It is time to take a serious stand against these perpetrators and reclaim our religion.

Muslims must be more vocal in their sentiments regarding such criminals and Islamic states must counter this behaviour proactively. To borrow from an unpopular phrase, the Islamic states must launch a psychological pre-emptive strike against these terrorists and more importantly those who encourage them. Muslim preachers who fail to condemn terror must either be re-educated or discredited completely, and those who excuse terror using certain conflicts as a pretext must be silenced because the poison that they spread today will come back to haunt us all tomorrow.

Some media outlets can also act as a conduit for the terrorists’ propaganda. The stories of reformed radicals such as Sayed Imam, also known as Dr Fadl, must be highlighted to the ignorant minority. Our message must be clear: “These acts of violence contradict all human values and can be justified by nothing.”

Nothing.

Sultan Al Qassemi

These are just samples of the outpouring of anger and frustration I read in Muslim media. Muslims are not unaware of the hatred and anger their co-religionists are generating with these senseless crimes and they are just as perplexed at how to stop it as we are, even more so given that they ostensibly share the same religion as the murderers.

Then there are those who say the Qur’an tells Muslims to spread their religion by the sword. Nothing can be further from the truth. In fact the Qur’an is full of statements showing that belief in any religion is an individual’s own concern and is a matter between the individual and God. Here are a few.

(2:256) “There is no compulsion in religion.” This is the clearest statement in the Qur’an against spreading religion by the sword.

(76:3) “We have truly shown him the way; he may be thankful or unthankful.”

(18:29) “The Truth is from your Lord; so let him who please believe and let him who please disbelieve.”

6:104) “Clear proofs have indeed come to you from your Lord; so whoever sees, it is for his own good; and whoever is blind, it is to his own harm.”

(17:7) “If you do good, you do good for your own souls. And if you do evil, it is for them.” (for your own souls)

It seems to me that the two predominant views portrayed in Western media about Muslims are either the condemnatory pieces that tar brush all Muslims with the Islamo-facist label, or those that help propagate their insane justifications for murder (Bush’s policies, Israeli policies, grinding poverty). Both are wrong.

The most common shared trait among all these writers is that they have not lived in a Muslim society – certainly not for any significant length of time. I’ve spent the greater part of the last six years living among Muslims in Kuwait, Iraq and Afghanistan. I’ve known Muslims who I’ve felt confident would lay down their life to protect me, just as I would do for them. I’ve seen Iraqi soldiers weep when their American counterparts were killed or wounded. I’ve seen the anger of Afghans when a foreign aid worker is killed or kidnapped. An unarmed Afghan bystander was killed in Kabul several weeks ago trying to thwart the kidnapping at gun-point of a French aid worker.

The vast majority of Muslims throughout the world are good, civilized human beings with whom we share many, if not most, values. This is, I believe, a fact. Yes, there are differences between Western societies and Islamic societies, but for the most part these differences are no bigger than a line drawn in the sand.

Playing into the Enemy's Hands

Below is an article from the Christian Science Monitor in the aftermath of the suicide attack on the Ministry of Information and Culture in Kabul. My analysis of this article appears below the article. The main point is that this is yet another example of the blissfully ignorant media playing right into the hands of the insurgents.


Insurgents increasingly employing complex attacks in Afghanistan
Thursday's strike on an Afghan ministry was carried out by a team using multiple attack methods.
By Anand Gopal Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor
from the October 31, 2008 edition


Kabul, Afghanistan - A suicide bomber detonated explosives inside a government ministry Thursday, killing at least five and injuring dozens. The attack is the latest in a series this year showing insurgents' ability to penetrate the capital using complicated and daring methods.

"Security in the capital is decreasing day by day," says Ajmal Karimi, analyst with the Center for Peace and Conflict studies, a Kabul-based think tank.

He says that Thursday's attack, which involved multiple insurgents and included small-arms fire, is an example of the sophisticated methods increasingly used.

"With these types of attacks the insurgents are able to make people feel that they cannot trust the government to keep them safe even in the capital," he says.

At least three insurgents entered the Ministry of Information and Culture, located in a busy section of Kabul, Thursday morning. Witnesses say a gunfight broke out between security officials and the guerrillas, followed by a massive blast that destroyed much of the ministry's first floor. According to some reports, two insurgents escaped the scene.

The Taliban claimed responsibility, saying they were targeting foreign advisers. Insurgents may also have hit the ministry because it was one of the least secure.

Kabul is heavily guarded, with thousands of police patrolling, many main arteries closed to traffic, and blast walls surrounding most government buildings. Yet insurgents have staged numerous high-profile attacks.

"In these types of attacks, the insurgents may send one suicide bomber toward the target while another fighter distracts security forces with gunfire," says Mr. Karimi.

While the attack involved a small team, many complex attacks involve greater numbers of fighters and a more diverse combination of attack methods. According to an American intelligence official with the international forces, this year has seen a 6 to 12 percent increase in assaults involving more than 20 insurgents and multiple attack methods.

The blast comes amid talk of negotiations between the Afghan government and the Taliban. "Our enemies are trying to undermine recent efforts by the government for a peaceful solution to end the violence," President Hamid Karzai said in a statement.
•Danna Harman contributed to this report from Kabul.

My comments:

The attack is the latest in a series this year showing insurgents' ability to penetrate the capital using complicated and daring methods.

This statement is never explained or elaborated anywhere in the article. What “complicated” or “daring” methods were used to “penetrate” the capital? Kabul is a big city with over 4 million inhabitants. There is not a solid wall, fence or other barrier that rings the city. The main roads are not the only ways into the city.

"Security in the capital is decreasing day by day," says Ajmal Karimi, analyst with the Center for Peace and Conflict studies, a Kabul-based think tank.

And we have arrived at this conclusion based upon what evidence? By the way it is the Center for Conflict and Peace Studies (CAPS) and Ajmal Karimi strangely does not appear on the staff page as an analyst. He may very well work there, but if he does he is a low-level researcher.

The CAPS website states: “Armed groups in Afghanistan, just as in the Middle East and Pakistan, use the media to propagate their message, solicit both moral and financial support, and provide distant training and exchange of logistical information required to launch successful operations.”

The Christian Science Monitor, just like the main stream media plays right into the insurgents’ hands with uninformed reports like this one.

Kabul is heavily guarded, with thousands of police patrolling, many main arteries closed to traffic, and blast walls surrounding most government buildings.

Thousands of police in a large sprawling city of four million is hardly surprising. The “main arteries” closed to traffic are those in the immediate vicinity of the Presidential Palace, the Ministry of the Interior (National Police Headquarters), and the Ministry of Defense. Hardly surprising given the threat of VBIED’s (Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device). In fact if these roads were left open, one would then need to be critical of lax security. It only takes one VBIED in the right place at the right time to create havoc. This isn’t much different from in the US where traffic is no longer allowed around certain government buildings. (Have you tried to drive in front of the White House lately?)

Yet insurgents have staged numerous high-profile attacks.

I’m very curious as to how we have arrived at “numerous” high-profile attacks. Let’s see: January 2008, Hotel Serena; April 2008, Assassination attempt on President Karzai; July 2008, Suicide VBIED attack on the Indian Embassy; October 2008, Suicide BBIED (Body Borne Improvised Explosive Device) at the Ministry of Information and Culture. That’s only four even though the media would have us believe that Kabul is about to fall to the Taliban. So far that works out to one every three months, but it still misses a key point.

What do three of the four have in common? In three of the four cases lax security around what should have been recognized as potential high-profile targets invited the attacks.

In the case of Hotel Serena, not only was security lax in the first place, there was advance warning of an impending attack and no action was taken to tighten security even though on the day of the attack the Norwegian embassy was hosting a reception there.

In the Indian Embassy attack the road that should have been blocked to regular traffic was not. The Indian Embassy is right across the street from the Afghan Ministry of the Interior, which may have actually been the intended target. Given that the road is now blocked except for authorized traffic, a repeat is unlikely.

He says that Thursday's attack (Oct 30), which involved multiple insurgents and included small-arms fire, is an example of the sophisticated methods increasingly used.

Three guys charging a lightly-guarded gate firing AK’s is hardly sophisticated, in fact it is pretty basic.

"With these types of attacks the insurgents are able to make people feel that they cannot trust the government to keep them safe even in the capital," he says.

Clearly that is the goal of this type of attack, whether or not such attacks have achieved this goal is a matter of conjecture. Within hours of this particular attack it was business as usual in this busy market part of town.

Insurgents may also have hit the ministry because it was one of the least secure.

This is the primary reason the insurgents hit this particular ministry. The Ministry is located off a busy market street where hundreds of people are milling all day long. Security here was very lax with virtually no “stand-off” to even slow a potential attacker who simply had to sprint the twenty yards from the gate to the front lobby and detonate.

Again, Kabul is a large, sprawling city with more points of entry than can be properly guarded by even a million police officers and yet there have been only four “high-profile” attacks this year (the year of the greatest number of attacks nation-wide). In at least three of the four attacks there were significant security lapses that contributed to creating conditions conducive to attack.

The enemy exploits perceived weakness. That should be expected. As hardening and awareness reduces opportunity, the enemy looks for new opportunities. That is why one cannot become complacent. We are facing a thinking enemy. It is idiotic to imagine that he will not adjust his tactics and methods to counter our actions. The fact that he does so is not indicative of increased capability on his part or deteriorating security on our part.

While the attack involved a small team, many complex attacks involve greater numbers of fighters and a more diverse combination of attack methods. According to an American intelligence official with the international forces, this year has seen a 6 to 12 percent increase in assaults involving more than 20 insurgents and multiple attack methods.

So what if they fail? As they have in all cases. The fact that a group of attackers uses hand grenades and small arms, makes an attack “complex” by military definitions, but this does not equate to “sophisticated” in the civilian sense of complication.

By the way, total casualties for the year are actually down significantly from last year. So despite the alleged increase in “sophistication” and “complexity” the attacks are less efficient. Higher concentrations of insurgents are not a liability to us because we have them out-gunned. When they choose to mass, they are easier to detect, target and kill.

Opinions vs News Reporting

There is a difference between reporting news and stating an opinion. Western media has gotten very bad at confusing the two. In their effort to “sell” a story, they package news in such a way that it is no longer news, but an opinion using selective bits of news to push an agenda. My opinion is that the Western media, owned by leftist-minded individuals, is pushing an agenda that advances their socialist ideals and seeks at every opportunity to discredit Western institutions.

Part of how they do this is most apparent in their “reporting” of events in the war-zone. To illustrate this, I’ll dissect the reporting of Alastair Leithead of the BBC on events that occurred on 18 August in Afghanistan. Leithead's text appears in italics.

Alastair Leithead of the BBC filed the following report on 19 August 2008:

Taleban Grow More Brazen

Kabul's early morning silence was broken last night first by the crunch of rockets exploding in the city, then by the emergency sirens at NATO headquarters warning the officers and generals to head for the shelters.

The rocket lead-in to the significant events of the day is disingenuous for a couple of reasons. First, rocket attacks are nothing new, they’ve been going on since around 2004 and for the most part, they are ineffective. These rockets may have exploded within the city limits, but in reality, they impacted at the edge of the city.

Second, he makes it sound like only officers and generals go to shelters when there are incoming rounds. The poor schmuck soldiers get to stay out and take it based on his wording. This is complete rubbish. In addition it overlooks the fact that about 99% of the city had no idea that there had been an attack until they saw the news the next day. I slept through it.

It was a vivid and eerie soundtrack of how close the insurgency is to the capital.

The second rocket attack in Kabul in less than a week will further feed the paranoia of Afghans and also the international community.

The first sentence is bad enough, but then he follow with his “…vivid and eerie soundtrack…” line. Is Alastair Leithead writing a novel, or is he reporting events? His third sentence about feeding the “paranoia” of Afghans (and idiot reporters) is laughable on the basis of how unremarkable the rocket attack was in the first place.

But that paranoia may not be misplaced - while the sirens were warning of incoming fire, French forces were fighting for their lives just 50km (31 miles) away.

They had been ambushed on Monday afternoon as they patrolled through Sarobi district in Kabul province, and despite sending in reinforcements, medical teams and attack aircraft they lost 10 soldiers - another 21 were injured.

He finally gets to one of the two truly significant events of the day, the attack on the French. But even his lead-in is not accurate in the facts. The French were ambushed in the afternoon in a fight that lasted until after dark. The fight lasted about three hours. The rockets actually came in long after the battle in Sarobi district was over, but that would have ruined his “fighting for their lives” line. Yep, generally in a firefight you are fighting for your life -- nothing new here either.

Then he says that despite reinforcements, air support, etc. 10 died and 21 were wounded. Of course this totally ignores the fact the almost all the casualties occurred in the first few minutes of the three hour long fight. Almost all the casualties occurred in the first minutes of the fight before all the extra stuff arrived to help out. After the initial surprise, the French were able to beat back the ambushers.

Word-choice and arrangement of chronological details in a way that “shaped” his story completely altered what should have been a straight-forward report on events, into an opinion article or non-fiction short-story.

Leithead continues:

It is one of the largest losses of life in NATO’s Afghan campaign and a huge blow to a French deployment which is already unpopular at home.

The first clause shows just how low-intensity things have been here the last several years. When 10 fatalities are among the largest losses of life in a seven year war, that’s saying a lot about how little has been happening.

There are reports of 100 insurgents attacking the convoy, of troops being captured and then killed.

If one is going to report on military events, it would seem that one would learn what one is talking about. It was not a convoy, it was a patrol. There is a huge difference.

What happened in that valley could have a significant impact on the French mission, so much so that President Nicolas Sarkozy is flying straight to Kabul to settle nerves and offer support.

One should know terrain terms when reporting on military events. “What happened in that valley” it wasn’t a valley, it was a mountain pass. The two terrain features are not synonyms and military implications are different.

The French soldiers may appreciate President Sarkozy’s show of support, but they didn’t need his “settling nerves.” While French politicians and the French populace may be spineless, their soldiers are not. Sarkozy’s visit was really for home consumption, not for any specific benefit for the troops.

And it wasn't the only major operation launched by the Taleban in one night.

An ambush of a patrol in an area that has not been patrolled much, isn’t a “major operation,” it is an ambush of a patrol. Nor was the ambush launched in the night. It was occurred in the afternoon.

In Khost, south eastern Afghanistan, up to 30 militants tried to storm the main American base in the town, just hours after a suicide car bomber had struck at the front gate killing 10 civilians working at Camp Salerno.

Finally, some straightforward reporting except that he phrases it such that you’d think the bad guys were “in the wire,” that they got close. Actually, they were engaged 1,000m away and never got close. Thirty dudes attacking a large US Army base is hardly a major operation. Three of the suicide bombers were shot before they could detonate and three others blew themselves up while running away.

Among those insurgents were at least half a dozen suicide bombers, trying to break into the camp and kill as many NATO soldiers as possible.

The second clause of this sentence is so redundant as to be silly. Like there is any chance that you thought the suicide bombers simply wanted to shop at the base store?

The attack was repelled and, as in Sarobi, many of the Taleban were killed or injured, but there appear to be plenty of others ready to pick up their guns, or strap on explosives vests, and take on a much better equipped and more highly trained army.

The first clause is relatively accurate, but the rest is pure supposition on his part. What constitutes “plenty” in the case of finding nuts crazy enough to blow themselves up? I have to believe that there are a finite number of people willing to do this. The fact is, every time the Taliban try to take on the “better-equipped and more highly trained army,” they get their heads handed to them. We want them to try to fight us like this. We want them to offer an open fight where they mass hundreds of guys. We have the advantage and they will lose every time.

The tactics are becoming more advanced and more brazen - it is as if the insurgents are gathering momentum of the growing insecurity and instability.

What is so advanced about a frontal assault on a fortified position where you are outgunned and outmanned? Brazen? Stupid is more like it. Again, it helps when writing about military matters to actually know what one is talking about. What Leithead completely overlooks when he talks about momentum, insecurity and instability is what was happening on the other side of the border at the same time.

The Pakistani Army is in the middle of a major operation (a real major operation involving thousands of troops) that has been going on for some sixteen days pounding the Taliban. The Taliban are not brazen, sophisticated or gathering momentum. They are fighting for their lives and they have nowhere to run.

Leithead concludes with:

On Monday, which was Afghanistan's Independence Day, much of Kabul was sealed off by thousands of extra police drafted in when the Taleban announced they were planning a major attack.

Leithead implies a cause and effect relationship here. There isn’t one. It is perfectly normal and prudent to increase security measures in advance of major public events. Kabul is a major city spread out over a large area with a population of almost 4 million. It takes lots of security forces to cover it. Afghanistan is a war zone. It would be idiotic not to increase security regardless of any specific threats. Do you want to bet that there will be more police present at the Democratic and Republican conventions? Think we are doing it because of some specific threat?

Guess what? There weren’t any security problems in Kabul on Afghanistan’s Independence Day. The day was quite peaceful in Kabul with the exception of the terrifying rocket attack that most of us slept through and didn’t find out about until much later the next day.

Stories like the one written by Leithead are designed to demoralize readers in the West. By doing so they hope, especially in an election year for the US, to influence public policy. Opinions ought to be left on the Editorial page where few voters venture. Front page news should be a presentation of what happened without all the colorful and slanted story-telling.

We Are Not Losing In Afghanistan

In his July 30, 2008 New York Times Op-ed piece titled, “Drilling in Afghanistan,” Thomas Friedman makes an astounding statement. “The main reason we are losing in Afghanistan is not because there are too few American soldiers, but because there are not enough Afghans ready to fight and die for the kind of government we want.” Of course he offers no evidence or proof of either clause in this sentence. About the only thread of reality in the sentence is that it is not a lack of American troops that is the “problem” in Afghanistan.

The piece overall has a good deal of truth, but the defeatist tone is disturbing. We are not losing in Afghanistan. Then again, this is the same Thomas Friedman who declared that we were losing in Iraq and that the surge would not work. He’s since changed his position on Iraq, but like all good liberals who can’t rest unless finding fault with the United States, he’s redirected his defeatism to Afghanistan.

Of course most of the pundits making such sweeping declarations are: a). not on the ground observing first-hand, b). not military professionals with any insight into what constitutes winning or losing, c). relying on armchair “experts” who fall into either category "a" or "b" or both, d). simply left-leaning anti-US media in the first place who have no intention of telling the truth.

If you will recall, when the Afghan affair started, pundits like Friedman uttered such absurdities as “no one has ever conquered Afghanistan” and “the Brits and the Soviets met disaster there.” These “truisms” have been trotted again now that Afghanistan has reentered public awareness. But are these truisms true? Are they relevant for the current operations?

No one has ever conquered Afghanistan. Well, if you mean the country Afghanistan, then that may be true since Afghanistan has only existed as such since 1747. But long before that, Alexander the Great and Genghis Khan succeeded in conquering Afghanistan. In fact the real story of Afghanistan is not one of being immune to conquest, but of successive waves of conquest throughout its history. A large part of that is due to its strategic position astride major trade routes.

The people who have lived in this land have indeed been fighting for centuries, but the people who live here now are a blend of all those peoples who have held sway here at one time or another. For example, the Hazara are thought to be descended from the Mongols who conquered “Afghanistan” in 1219. Many Nuristani have European features like red or blond hair and green or blue eyes and a lighter complexion. Some say this is a legacy of Alexander’s conquest, but it may actually be far older. So it isn’t correct to say that “the Afghans” have always successfully repelled the invader.

The Brits and Soviets met disaster here. That may be true, but it is also irrelevant to the current situation. The British tried to conquer and rule Afghanistan in the 19th century, part of the “Great Game” between Russia and Britain. However, the qualitative differences between the British Army in the 19th century and the “Russian aided” Afghans were not that significant. One could even argue that the British generals were not as competent as the Afghan generals. The British were defeated in stand-up army-to-army battles. While Pashtun tribes also employed guerrilla tactics against the British, it was defeat in main battles that spelled doom for the British.

The Soviet experience looks like it might be relevant since it is only twenty years in the past, but this view is also misleading. Again, the Soviets intended to conquer and rule. Their political goals significantly affected how they fought and the methodologies they employed. Pundits like to say that the Afghans humbled a mighty “modern” army, but this is only partly accurate.

As hindsight has shown us, the Soviet war-machine was already in serious technological decline when they invaded Afghanistan, but it was not their decaying military apparatus that doomed the Soviet experience to failure. Nor did Stinger missiles, the indomitable spirit of the mujahedeen, foreign fighters, foreign money, and sanctuaries in Pakistan win the war for the Afghans. They all played key roles, but the ingredient that made the war unwinnable for the Soviets was brought into the country within their own army. The inflexible Soviet system, that same system that doomed them in economic competition with the West, doomed their efforts in Afghanistan.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 began just like their successful invasions of East Germany in 1953, Hungary in 1956, and Czechoslovakia in 1968. Everything went with surgical precision and minimal casualties. For all intents and purposes, to outside observers it was another display of irresistible Soviet might. Western powers feared that the Soviets would extend the push through southern Pakistan to the Gulf, thereby effectively threatening the flow of oil from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. But in less than three months, the war took on a different complexion and the Soviets started experiencing military defeat at the hands of the mujahedeen.

The Soviets came into Afghanistan with a strategy better suited to European combat and with an organizational structure and doctrine so rigid, it never fully adapted to the requirements of fighting a guerrilla war against a determined opponent in inhospitable terrain. Guerrilla warfare requires decentralized decision-making and freedom of action for units down to squad size. It requires a coherent national strategy that places proper emphasis on aspects of soft power to win the “heart and minds” of the people and an understanding of this need on the parts of the soldiers who must carry the fight to the enemy. The Soviets were incapable, by the very essence of their system, of carrying this off.

This was not intended to be a major discussion of how the Soviets failed, but an illustration of how the Soviet experience is irrelevant to the discussion of our experience in Afghanistan. Before moving on, however, some key numbers should be considered. Soviet strength varied between 90,000 and 104,000 troops each of the ten years they occupied Afghanistan. 642,000 Soviet soldiers served in Afghanistan. Approximately 15, 000 were killed or missing. Far more telling was that the Soviets suffered 469,685 wounded in action and non-battle casualties due to illness, or 73 percent of the total force. 415,932 were disease non-battle casualties of which 115,308 were infectious hepatitis and 31,080 were from typhoid. (Statistics from: The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan, Lester W. Grau, Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS 10th Edition, 2005)

In other words, the Soviets suffered almost as many typhoid casualties as the United States has troops in Afghanistan right now. These kinds of non-battle casualties are unheard of in modern armies and they speak volumes on the hygiene and conditions under which the average Soviet soldier lived while in Afghanistan. The Soviets averaged 1,500 killed and missing, 5375 wounded and 41,593 disease non-battle casualties per year. This means they averaged about 50 percent total casualties per year.

Fast-forward to August 2008 and the US and NATO campaign in Afghanistan. To date about 921 coalition troops have been killed in Afghanistan (includes battle and non-battle fatalities). US, British and Canadian forces are doing most of the fighting and have suffered most of these casualties. In seven years, we are averaging about 132 killed (battle and non-battle fatalities) per year. We have had about 7,900 wounded and non-battle casualties, which translates to 1129 wounded and non-battle casualties per year. The Soviets exceeded our seven-year total in their first year in Afghanistan. Note that these casualties include all the NATO/ISAF countries. This is a different fight.

Lest someone say that Afghan casualties are not included in these numbers, keep in mind that during the Soviet occupation, 1.5 million Afghans died (150,000 per year) and a further 5 million were refugees in Iran and Pakistan. To date, fewer than 30,000 Afghans have died in this war (including combatants from both sides and civilians or 4286 per year). Almost 70 percent of the Afghan civilian fatalities, which are less than 30 percent of the total Afghan fatalities, have been caused by Al-Qaeda and the Taliban.

Somehow pundits like Friedman look at Afghanistan today, draw a quick connection to other nations’ experiences here and claim that we are losing. But there is no connection except that the war is being fought in the same place and some of the players are the same. We are not losing Afghanistan. As the numbers show, our experience is nothing like the Soviet experience and any attempt to make that correlation is a real stretch by an order of magnitude.

Is the fight simple? Is there any way it can be finished quickly? The answer to both questions is, no. The fight is complex and involves a great deal of soft power applied in un-sexy ways that the media does not deem fit for the evening news. A suicide bomber is far sexier than a news story about providing alternatives to poppy production or a new school. The insurgency can and will be defeated, but it will take time. Let’s just hope the media doesn’t succeed in sabotaging this mission like they almost succeeded in sabotaging the operation in Iraq.

As stated in an earlier post, war is won in the will. The numbers do not matter as much as the will to keep fighting. The Western media is working overtime to break the West’s will to win this fight and to hand the enemy a cheap victory.

Playing With Numbers

Read these statements carefully:

“More than 2,500 people — mostly militants — have been killed in insurgency-related violence in Afghanistan this year.”

“More than 8,000 people died in attacks last year, according to the U.N., the most since the 2001 U.S.-led invasion.”

“The number of militant attacks has been on the rise this summer compared with the same period last year, NATO officials say.”

These three statements occur in the same AP report that is attempting to show how the situation in Afghanistan is deteriorating in the face of a “resurgent” Taliban. Did anyone do the math? Did anyone question? All three statements may be true independently, but together as proof to support a faulty analysis, they are false.

In 6.5 months in 2008, we have had roughly 2,500 people killed, or 385 killed per month (mostly militants…a good thing, yes?). In the 12 months of 2007 there were roughly 8,000 killed, or 667 killed per month. So in the face of the “deteriorating situation” in Afghanistan, we are seeing a net decline in fatalities of 282 per month, or a decline of 42%. This represents a deteriorating situation? This is evidence of a “resurgent” Taliban? I would think it’s an improvement.

If the number of attacks has increased overall, then the lethality of those attacks has declined. Clearly the bad guys are not very efficient killers. If they attack more, but fail to produce greater casualties, then this should be cause for celebration. The bad guys have been forced to scale down their attacks, opting instead for more small attacks with reduced lethality, particularly in light of locals, police the Afghan National Army and NATO being more aggressive in stopping attacks and hunting down insurgents.

Powerful Taliban Weapon

The Taliban has a powerful weapon and they are employing it to help turn the tide against Afghan and Coalition Forces in Afghanistan. Is it a new type of IED? Is it a new, deadlier rocket launcher or mortar? Is it Islamic fanaticism fueled by hatred of foreign invaders? Is it thousands of new dedicated and trained recruits? No, it is none of these things.

The Taliban’s powerful weapon is the Western media. Bored with peace seemingly breaking out in Iraq, the media have turned their attention to Afghanistan where a number of factors have contributed to a higher level of violence. It is almost as if, stung by their dire predictions and analysis proving false in Iraq, they feel compelled to try again in Afghanistan. A recent battle near the remote village of Wanat along the border between Nuristan Province and Kunar Province in Afghanistan is an excellent example of how the media twists facts to their defeatist world-view.

MSNBC screamed “Taliban Overrun US Base” on the Internet, however clicking on the link and reading the story we find out that this is not exactly true. The story was laced with statements by anonymous “experts” and “officials” making verification of anything more than a little difficult. The Associated Press soberly tells us, “Deadly raid raises doubts in Afghanistan: Attack highlights uncertainty about U.S. ability to turn back Taliban.” (AP, 14 July 2008) Does it really? Whose doubts are “raised” and who is “uncertain?” We are never really told because all their “sources” don’t want to be identified.

I understand the need to have attention-grabbing headlines, but “Deadly raid” in the context of combat between armed military forces is a bit ridiculous. Excuse me, but part of the exercise in fighting a war is to inflict casualties on one’s enemy. That’s the package, that’s what both sides are trying to do. So to hyperventilate over casualties strikes me as more than a trifle silly. Police attempting to arrest someone in a raid that turns violent and ends in fatalities deserves such a headline. A story about combat does not.

The AP goes on to say, “Violence has been increasing in Afghanistan, and many people are questioning whether the Taliban-led insurgency is gaining, not losing, momentum seven years after the hard-line Islamic regime was ousted by a U.S.-led invasion.” Many people? Who are these “many people?” We have done a proper statistically significant poll to determine this, no doubt. The AP leaned very heavily on the recently disgraced and recently fired former Governor of Nuristan Province Tamim Nuristani whose own ineptitude contributed to security problems in Nuristan.

Further down in the article, where few American readers will venture, are some cogent answers. Of course, the media know that most Western readers do not read more than the first couple paragraphs, so all the doom and gloom is printed there. Any intelligent analysis and reason lies toward the end of the story where it will be least effective in influencing public opinion.

Why was this particular base attacked and why now? It was not because the Taliban are that much stronger, which the AP leads the reader to believe in the first third of their story. The base was attacked because it was a new base with incomplete defenses. It looked like it might be an easy target. While sounding the siren call of defeat over “the most deadly attack on US troops since 2005,” the AP completely ignores the fact that the majority of US casualties actually occurred outside the main camp in a lightly secured observation post. The casualties were not due to the enemy “breaching the defenses” and engaging the defenders from within the perimeter.

What gets glossed over is that the bad guys threw their best punch and got the stuffing kicked out of them. The bad guys outnumbered the defenders by about 3 to 1 and ended up with a casualty exchange of 11 to 1. In military terms for our side, it was not a bad day’s work. The bad guys found this nut tougher to crack than they anticipated. It is guessed, even by the former governor, that there were about 600 Taliban/Al-Qaeda fighters in the area before the attack. Their numbers have been reduced by about a third in just one fight. The Taliban did exactly what we want them to do: namely, seek an open engagement with our troops. The Taliban will lose any such fight.

The media keep pounding the drum for the Taliban, emphasizing the fact of higher NATO casualties, specifically US casualties as compared to Iraq the last two months. What gets ignored, or placed in that “unread” portion of their reporting, is that our forces are going into remote regions where we have not yet had a presence. We are bound to have more contact with Taliban and Al-Qaeda as a result of patrolling their sanctuaries. We are doing the right thing by placing small units out in the country-side rather than hiding on our well-secured large base camps.

Using correct counter-insurgency methods increases our casualties in the short run, but helps us separate insurgents from the populace. Separated from the populace, insurgents lose their ability to hide and operate freely. Thus segregated, they are more easily drawn into combat and defeated. They lose their “street cred.”

Lastly there is the usual AP disclaimer at the end of virtually every combat or suicide attack report they file. “More than 2,500 people — mostly militants — have died in insurgency-related violence this year, according to an Associated Press tally of figures from Afghan and Western officials.” The number of casualties changes as the year goes on, but the quick comment, “mostly militants” should make people sit up and take notice. If most of the casualties are the very people we are trying to kill, how is that an indicator of a resurgent Taliban?